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1.       Introduction 
Migrant remittances are increasingly recognized as an instrument of development for 
a large number of countries in the transition and the developing world.  Several studies are 
available in the literature that devotes substantial attention to the welfare implications of 
migration and inward remittances.  Some of the major issues center around the effect of 
remittances on exchange rates (Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo, 2002; Faini, 1994; etc.), on 
development finance and macroeconomic volatility (Chami et al, 2003; Quartey and 
Blankson, 2004; Sayan, 2004; etc.) and most importantly, on development and welfare 
among the non-migrants (Djajic, 1986; Djajic and Milbourne, 1988; Lundahl, 1985; 
McCormick and Wahba, 2000; Rivera-Batiz, 1986; Rodriguez, 1996; Russel, 1992; 
Salimano, 2003; Stark et al, 1986 on remittances and inequality, etc.).  The present chapter 
focuses on the impact of migrant remittances on the level of poverty in the state of Kerala in 
India, which is well known for its large stock of migrant workers. The major impact of such 
migration on the source country operates through the remittances sent home.1  The non-
migrant members of these households purchase better living standards, school attendance, 
access to health care facilities, and provisions for future with the aid of such remittance 
receipts.  Therefore, the impact of remittances on development and more specifically, poverty 
are considerable for all such low and middle-income countries.   
Kerala, like most other countries or regions therein produces a heterogeneous group 
of migrants, living and working virtually all over the world.  Admittedly, a larger proportion 
of migrants, which range from medical practitioners, accountants, lawyers etc. as highly 
skilled professional, to vehicle drivers, mechanics, construction workers as relatively 
unskilled workers are located in different countries of the Middle East.  The trend has been 
increasing over time and it naturally attracted attention from various quarters trying to 
                                                 
1
 Of course there are several other sources thorough which migration affects development and welfare, such as 
higher human capital formation (see Stark and Wang, 2002).    
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comprehend the impact of such large exodus on the regional and national levels.  While many 
such studies look at the socio-economic, demographic and political consequences of 
migration and remittances in Kerala as already discussed, this particular chapter offers some 
specific assessments that can serve as important components for the overall macroeconomic 
picture of the province.      
It is generally observed that a large part of the remittances are received in kind and 
transferred through unofficial channels (Agarwal and Horowitz, 2002; Ratha, 2003, etc.) and 
therefore not accounted for in the overall impact assessment.  Albeit further research is 
needed to reach a general consensus, it is nonetheless understood that larger and more regular 
remittances originate from among the relatively unskilled sections of the migrants for 
sustaining their low or middle-income households in the source countries.  Consequently, the 
impact of remittances on poverty becomes a rather important issue for discussion in the 
related domain, although once again, often constrained by the lack of relevant information.   
A few recent studies do offer interesting observations on migrant remittances and 
poverty.  For example, Adams Jr. and Page (2003) consider a large group of low and middle 
income countries, use country-specific studies on remittances, income distribution and 
poverty, and conclude that a 10 percent increase in the share of migrants in the country’s 
population (for the cross-country sample) would lower the poverty level in the country by 1.6 
percentage.  It is interesting to note that even the physical volume of international migration – 
defined as the share of a country’s population that is living abroad – has a strong impact on 
reducing poverty in the developing world. 
  They also establish that the poverty head-count ratio (henceforth, HCR), the poverty 
gap index (henceforth, PG, measuring depth of poverty) and the squared poverty gap index 
(hereafter, SPG, measuring severity of poverty) all respond negatively and significantly to 
both emigration and inward remittances.  This should imply that if more remittances flow 
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into the host economy (or if the country produces more emigrants, and it may be causally 
related), it is capable of reducing not only the absolute number of poor people in that country, 
but also the mean distance below the poverty line (as percentage of the poverty line, and 
measuring the spread of poverty below the poverty line).2  Individual country studies also 
largely corroborate these results in addition to bringing up other issues of considerable 
importance for many poor migrant sending economies.  Quartey and Blankson (2004) for 
example, show that migrant remittances tend to move in opposite directions vis-à-vis 
household income and help to reduce the impact of macroeconomic shocks in Ghana through 
consumption smoothing.  Similarly, Aredo (2004) observes the effect of remittances on the 
extent of urban poverty in Ethiopia and conclude that remittances help managing risk facing 
members of the households in adverse situation (viz. during food shortages due to climatic 
factors, such as drought or flood, loss of occupation due to economic problems, etc.).                                       
All of these studies also note that migrant remittances have been steadily increasing 
for many of the developing countries and India which is well known for its large annual 
remittance receipts is no exception.  The official remittances to India in the 2005-06 financial 
year reached 21 billion USD and a large part of this flowed in to Kerala, a southern province, 
producing the largest share of emigrants in the country.  While, the migrant remittances 
contribute about 3 percent of India’s GDP presently, the share of remittances in the net state 
domestic product (NSDP) of Kerala is quite large.  This, and of course the impact such large 
transfers creates for the local economy may be one of the reasons why the state of Kerala, 
unlike any other province in the country, maintains a systematic record of emigration (mainly 
to the Gulf countries in the Middle East) and a moderately long time series data on official 
remittances received.  This has been accompanied by more micro level data accumulation 
through a survey of 10,000 migrant households in various districts of Kerala conducted by 
                                                 
2For India, the Poverty Gap Index for the year 2003-04 has been 8.1.      
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Zachariah et al. (1999) offering information on a large number of demographic dimensions 
associated with migration and remittance receipts for these households.  The large repository 
of information has subsequently been used for reflecting on the socio-economic and 
demographic implications for Kerala (Kannan and Hari, 2002; Zachariah et al., 1999, 2000, 
2001; Zachariah and Rajan, 2004, etc.).   
The aspects covered in this chapter have eluded the literature so far, and may be 
sufficiently useful in understanding the complementary macroeconomic implications of 
remittances for the province of Kerala.  The focal point of the paper as mentioned earlier is 
the causal implications of inward migrant remittances on poverty.  This constitutes an in 
depth analysis of the role of remittances as affecting urban and rural poverty levels in Kerala.  
A working hypothesis in this regard would certainly be in favor of lower head count ratios 
resulting from remittance.  In other words, a rise in the flow of remittances is expected to 
reduce the number of people living below the poverty lines in both urban and rural parts of 
the province.  However, the degree of such improvement may be conditional on several 
factors that we discuss below. 
Before delving deeper into this relationship, it would be appropriate to examine 
certain other features characterizing the flow of migrant remittances in Kerala.  This includes 
observing whether there exists any structural change in the aggregate flow of both emigrants 
and remittances for Kerala.  In other words, measurement of structural change helps to 
identify whether there has been any sudden shift or alteration in the general trends in these 
items.  Next, we study whether real remittances in Kerala move ‘pro-cyclically’ or ‘counter-
cyclically’ with real NSDP (Net State Domestic Product at 1993 prices) over a period of 31 
years between 1973 and 2003.  A pro-cyclical movement of the real remittances should imply 
a strong correlation (or co-movement) between macroeconomic up-swings or downswings in 
the state and the flow of remittances, while counter-cyclical tendencies refer to situations, 
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where remittance flow is observed to decline as the household income or state level income 
increases.  On the one hand, it is an interesting observation in the sense that it can reflect on 
the general perception on the nature and purpose of remittance flows, and on the other it can 
influence suitable policy formulations.        
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows.  Section 2.1 offers a brief discussion 
on the evolving fiscal and financial conditions in India that helps to locate the issue of 
migrant remittances in a relevant context.  This subsection also includes a brief description of 
the changes in trade and capital market policies that may have been significant in affecting 
both emigration and remittance inflows.  Before venturing into the remittance-poverty nexus 
in section 2.2 we briefly offer observations on structural changes and cyclical tendencies of 
real remittances (nominal remittances divided by the consumer price index).  Data for all 
these exercises are obtained from various issues of the Economic Review – Kerala State 
Planning Board and Zachariah and Rajan (2004).  Section 3 concludes with general 
observations and policy implications.    
 
2.1 Reforms, Migrant Remittances and Fiscal conditions in India    
For a country that receives large flow of remittances on a regular basis, the impact on 
the balance of payment is often put under close scrutiny.3  As per the prevailing law on the 
status of workers, who remain outside India for more than 186 days during a financial year 
and therefore regarded as non-resident Indians (NRIs), the remittances received from such 
sources are recorded under current transfers.  In India workers’ remittances comprise 
transfers towards family maintenance, personal donations and gifts to charitable trusts, 
repatriation of savings by Indian residents abroad, etc.,  (these are distinguished from capital 
movements which involve transfer of ownership of fixed assets, and forgiveness of liabilities 
                                                 
3
 See Table 1 for the volume of inward remittances in India between 1991 and 2006.  These receipts are 
distinguished by the types of accounts and transfers as described in the figure, and as documented by the 
Reserve Bank of India (RBI).    
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by creditors).   A description of such flows is given in Figure 2 below.  Since 1997-98, the 
official statistics have clubbed these disaggregated entries in to a generic head ‘inward 
remittances from Indian workers abroad for family maintenance, etc.’ These official transfers, 
however, capture only a small portion of the total receipts, since it is widely known that a 
significant volume of workers’ remittances transit through informal channels, goods and 
precious metals and gems, and cash brought in by returning Indians.  With the institution of 
the market-determined exchange rate regime and current account convertibility in the early 
1990s, workers’ remittances recovered from the stagnation of the second half of the 1980s to 
cross US $ 8 billion by the mid-1990s. As the premium commanded by the unofficial 
exchange rate declined significantly and trade and payment restrictions eased, workers’ 
remittances were channeled through new routes other than the traditional categories described 
earlier. For instance, with the liberalization of bullion imports by allowing them to be brought 
in as baggage by returning Indians under a nominal customs duty, remittances took the form 
of gold and silver which rose from US $ 1 billion in 1992-93 (the year of liberalization) to 
nearly US $ 3 billion before being completely extinguished by the full relaxation of bullion 
imports under open general license.  Another route of inward remittance from workers’ has 
traditionally been through local withdrawals from deposit accounts offered to NRIs.  In recent 
years, this route has gathered importance enough to warrant separate classification. 
Furthermore, India was denied access to international financial markets by the downgrading 
of sovereign credit ratings throughout the 1990s. During this difficult period, India issued 
foreign currency bonds directed specifically at the Indian diasporas abroad with attractive 
interest rate differentials, exchange guarantees, fiscal concessions, and facilities for local 
transfers.  In retrospect, these issuances turned out to be effective avenues for the 
securitisation of workers’ remittances as the bulk of these bonds were redeemed locally.  The 
changing profile of workers’ remittances under private transfers clearly shows that transfers 
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in the form of unrequited one-way flows not involving quid pro quo (gifts and donations) are 
only a miniscule portion of India’s private transfers. 
The 1970s ushered in sweeping changes in the economic environment – the collapse 
of the Bretton Woods pegs, the first oil shock and starting up of massive private capital flows. 
In India, the move to an adjustable pegged exchange rate regime, based on a trade-weighted 
basket of currencies, corrected for the overvaluation in the exchange rate. Coupled with a rise 
in international prices of gold, brought about a sharp decline in the premium commanded by 
the unofficial exchange rate and a disincentive for routing workers’ earnings through 
informal channels.  Simultaneously, the national authorities undertook measures to provide 
financial incentives to draw earnings from Indian labor in to banking channels. These policy 
measures took the form of introduction of foreign- and local-currency denominated deposit 
schemes with significant interest rates vis-à-vis international and domestic interest rates. 
Foreign currency deposits were provided exchange rate guarantees and both kinds of deposits 
were provided tax benefits and full repatriability.  Explicit in these policy measures was a 
clear understanding that earnings from Indian labor deployed abroad are sent home through a 
variety of channels and that there were policy instruments which could garner these flows to 
overcome the foreign exchange constraint.  For the authorities, the definitional restrictiveness 
of workers’ remittances in current account was by no means an impediment to tapping the 
legitimate rewards of the successful and time-tested capability of locating domestic labor 
internationally.  Indeed, a similar approach characterized a number of recipients of labor 
earnings – foreign exchange bearer certificates in Pakistan, dual exchange rates in 
Bangladesh, foreign currency deposits in Turkey, matriculas consulares in Mexico to name a 
few.   
Over the years, net inflows into NRI deposit accounts in India have grown 
significantly in terms of magnitude even as the deposit schemes have been restructured to 
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narrow interest differentials and eschew exchange guarantees.  Encouraged by the success in 
mobilizing labor earnings through the financial account of the BoP, especially in difficult 
times, the authorities have employed foreign currency bonds as well as direct and portfolio 
investment channels specifically designed for Indians working abroad.  Foreign currency 
bonds have brought in US $ 11.3 billion since 1991 and have helped the economy to tide over 
the crisis of 1991, the sanctions imposed by the US (1998) and the adverse global 
environment (2000). As mentioned earlier, a predominant portion of these bonds re-entered 
the country on redemption either as current transfers or as inflows into the deposit schemes, 
clearly identifying the centre of economic interest.  Importantly, inflows of labor earnings in 
to the financial account have occurred without diminishing inflows in to the current account. 
This suggests that there has been switching of funds from illegal to legal channels.  For the 
recorded BoP statistics, therefore, there has been an addition rather than substitution of 
workers’ remittances.  
 
 
2.2. Migrant Remittances and Poverty in Kerala  
 
 As discussed above, we begin by a brief characterization of the structural changes and 
cyclicality involving emigrants and migrant remittances for Kerala.  Table 4 provides 
evidence on the magnitude of emigration from Kerala and the remittance received.   
a. Structural Changes in Emigration and Remittances 
 
Identifying structural changes for a variable observed over a period of time provides 
an important step in revealing the true nature of the time dimension embedded in that series.  
Stated simply, the structural change helps to identify if the variable under consideration 
reports any movement for a particular year (or over a number of years) that is different from 
the trend line it generally follows.  Now a relevant question is what inference does one draw 
out of this observation?  While there may be many interpretations, the one useful in the 
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current context would be that if structural changes are of uncertain magnitudes and timing 
they increase the difficulty in forecasting, complicate our interpretation of the relevant 
variables and often misguide policy choices based on our understanding of the prevailing and 
future trends in the economy. 4   
We find that the aggregate emigration from Kerala varies significantly over the period 
under consideration.  To be precise, the emigration trend has followed the ‘expected’ trend 
till 1999 identifying the break year, after which it has taken a sudden leap.  The structural 
changes may have been in turn influenced by several changes in both the local economy and 
the destination countries, an investigation into which is beyond the scope of the present study.  
However, an even more modified test display that the emigration trend did not follow the 
trend for most of the time, i.e., between 1984 and the middle of 1999, after which it follows 
the trend again till the end of period in 2003.  Similarly for the trend in total remittances, one 
can observe that between 1984 and middle of year 2000, the remittances do not follow the 
expected trend line.  The tendency of not following the time pattern is even more pronounced 
in the case where migrant remittance is calculated as a fraction of the net state domestic 
product in Kerala.  This simply means that the expected trend in such share is either above or 
below the expected path.5                 
 
b. Do migrant remittances move with the income cycles in Kerala? 
An investigation into the relationship between cycles in net state domestic product in 
Kerala and the remittance inflows demands information on the fluctuations around observed 
trends for each variable.6  Recently, Sayan (2004) studies the cyclicality of Turkish 
                                                 
4
 In economics, the structural change is calculated by using the well-known Chow Test.  For further detail, see 
for example, Davidson and MacKinnon (1993).   
5All the above information can therefore be summed up in the following Table (Table 2).    
6A well-known method, namely the Hodrick-Prescott filter separates the trend of each series (i.e. de-trends) 
from its cyclical (fluctuating) components.  The test of pro-cyclicality or counter-cyclicality between two 
variables is in obtaining the correlation between the cyclical components of the variables and not the trends.  At 
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remittances originating in Germany to find that it is pro-cyclical (as defined in the previous 
section) with the real GDP in Turkey, but acyclical with the real gross national income in 
Germany.  Presently, we comment on the main findings from the application of this 
methodology to the case of Kerala.  Pro-cyclicality (counter-cyclicality) indicates the 
tendency of real remittances to move above the trend, when the corresponding real income 
variable is above (below) its respective trend. 
Subsequently, we have re-calculated the aggregate remittances and the NSDP as real 
remittances and real NSDP respectively, by using CPI for industrial workers (base year 1993) 
as the price deflator.  Now, we calculate the contemporaneous correlation coefficient between 
the cyclical fluctuations in real remittances and real NSDP at 0.481, which leads us to 
conclude that the real remittances flowing to Kerala is strongly pro-cyclical with the real 
NSDP between 1973 and 2003.  In terms of policy, it should mean that a rise in state income 
attracts more remittances in the province and therefore the entire economy can attain higher 
levels of both simultaneously.  However, on the flip side, a downturn in state performance 
would influence lower inflow of remittances and can cause further distress.  The other aspect 
requiring emphasis is the fact that migrant remittances do not play the role of insurance 
against visible distress in the economy.  One possible explanation of this aggregative feature 
is that, workers tend to migrate more under better circumstances prevailing at home and 
subsequently send back remittances, while staying around in the home country in case of 
general distress.  Clearly, this has enormous implications for poverty alleviation arising out of 
remittance movements that we explore next.   
c. Effects of Migrant Remittances on Poverty  
Finally, let us concentrate the analysis on the impact of migrant remittances on urban 
and rural poverty levels in Kerala between 1973 and 2003.  Given the fact that the migrant 
                                                                                                                                                        
the regional or state-level this requires de-trending the real remittances and the real NSDP and isolating the 
cyclical counterparts.    
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remittances received in Kerala increasingly constitutes a large percentage of the NSDP (a rise 
from 0.57% in 1973 to about 23% in 2000; Kannan and Hari, 2002), it is expected that the 
impact of the remittance earnings (both cash and kind) is positive and significant on the 
income and consumption levels of not only the direct recipients of the remittances but also 
for the larger society.   
One may start by following the growth-poverty relationship as in Ravallion and Chen 
(2001) and recently applied in Adams Jr. and Page (2003) to measure the impact of 
remittances on poverty for a group of developing countries.  As briefly mentioned before, for 
74 low and middle-income countries Adams Jr. and Page (2003) find that remittances 
(emigrants) as share of a country’s GDP (population), the country’s GINI coefficient 
(measure of income inequality), the per capita GDP itself and the per capita (per head) mean 
expenditure for respective countries all significantly explain the decline in poverty head count 
ratios and the depth and severity of the same.  In particular, they find that a rise in the share 
of remittances in a country’s GDP lowers the share of people living in poverty by 1.6 percent.   
There are a few country-specific experiences reported in the literature as well.  For 
example, Zarate-Hoyos (2004) shows that for Mexican households receiving monthly 
remittances of $476 on an average tend to invest and save a larger portion of that inflow and 
that there is no evidence of any demonstration effect on current consumption.  The remittance 
flow is however, more concentrated in few regions and select municipalities within those 
regions.  Also, the average annual growth rate of remittance receipts is about 100 percent for 
urban and 75 percent for rural households in these regions.  The study also finds positive 
impact of remittances on the physical well-being, quality of housing, labor productivity etc. 
across the sample households.   
While a detailed connection between remittances and poverty at the aggregative level 
is unavailable for India despite large remittance inflows into the country, region-specific data 
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and analyses for Kerala have been considerable.  For example, Zachariah et al. (1999, 2002) 
claim that the outreach of the remittances received is substantial among the local inhabitants 
– contributing to their educational, health and other conspicuous consumption expenditures.  
The benefits of remittances are also expected to be more widely dispersed for Kerala than 
what is observed in most other regional or country experiences, typically because the 
emigrants originate not from one or a few major locations, but from all over the state 
covering both predominantly urban and rural districts (Map in the appendix).  In fact, the 
districts of Malappuram and Kannur separately produced more emigrants in 2004, than the 
capital city of Thiruvananthapuram (Table 3).  Also, the percentage change in emigrants from 
several districts (Kottayam registers a 200% increase within a five year period) is quite high 
compared to the state capital.  Therefore, it is quite plausible that the impact of remittances is 
considerable for both rural and urban poverty levels in the state.  This motivates the present 
exercise in measuring the impact of Remittances as a share of NSDP on the urban and rural 
head count ratios for the province of Kerala, the poverty gap and the squared poverty gap 
obtained from the state level and national level surveys on poverty and inequality.  It is also 
clearly documented in several other studies on poverty and inequality in India, that national 
or state level surveys report the percentages of poor people and the gini coefficients only 
intermittently over a period of time.  The poverty and inequality measurements available for 
this purpose have only 13 entries for the state of Kerala between 1973 and 2003.  Using 
these, we construct a panel data set (cross-section and time series, together) between 1973 
and 2003 where our intention is to explain the changes in HCR urban and rural, poverty gap 
and squared poverty gap subject to changes in Per Capita NSDP (PCNSDP), the GINI 
Coefficient for Kerala, the Average Per Capita Expenditure (APCE) and the Remittance as 
proportion of NSDP (REM/NSDP).  In fact, by manipulating the data with logarithmic values 
(due to varying units and uneven values) we obtain the elasticity (sensitivity) of the impact of 
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a change in each of these explanatory variables on the choice of dependent variable and this 
can be directly utilized for designing policies to lower the extent of poverty.  For example, if 
one obtains that HCR for urban households is negatively related to PCNSDP and the 
elasticity is high, it should imply that decline in urban poverty is highly sensitive to rise in 
PCNSDP, and similarly for all other factors.                  
 The major findings include the following.7  The urban head-count ratio (HCRU) and 
the rural head-count ratio (HCRR) register negative sensitivities with both PCNSDP and 
(REM/NSDP), although the former is not significant by pure technical criterion.  The 
sensitivity of head count ratio to the remittance share in NSDP is quite small for both urban 
and rural areas.  However, the absolute value of the level of sensitivity of HCRR to 
(REM/NSDP) is higher than that of HCRU to (REM/NSDP).  This implies that a 100 percent 
increase in remittance as share of NSDP shall reduce the rural head count ratio by 8 percent 
compared to a possible reduction in urban head count ratio by 7 per cent.  When it comes to 
poverty gap (PG) and squared poverty gap (SPG), the (REM/NSDP) continues to have a 
negative sensitivity and of increasingly higher magnitudes, however, again with inadequate 
technical significance to accept them as deterministic.  It is probably not unexpected that 
remittances as share of NSDP by itself would not be instrumental in lowering the depth and 
severity of the poverty situation in the province.  The sensitivity of both rural and urban 
poverty estimates, with that of the level of inequality (GINI) are close to one and highly 
significant.  In other words, higher the level of inequality, higher is the level of poverty and it 
follows an almost one-to-one correspondence.  In isolation such a result is neither novel nor 
unexpected. What is special about our finding is the fact, that we consider such changes in the 
rural and urban poverty measures in the presence of remittance receipts by respective 
households, when remittance receipts by itself can alter the level of intra-household 
                                                 
7
 The complete econometric exercise may be made available to the interested reader on request.   
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inequality.  Our findings show that it is quite likely to expect a rising income inequality 
between the households owing to inflow of remittances and that in turn can exacerbate the 
poverty situation.        
In brief therefore, the relationships explored in this section clearly identify certain 
sources that can help to reduce rural and urban poverty in a significant manner.  For example, 
the relationship between the remittance as share of NSDP and both HCRU and HCRR being 
negative it implies that a higher relative contribution from migrant remittances directly 
reduces the poverty levels.  The impact is reinforced if one brings in the role of average per 
capita consumption expenditure as being influenced by remittance flows and then influencing 
the poverty reduction in a meaningful way.   
 
3. General observations and policies 
On the basis of the above findings what one needs perhaps is a policy thread that by 
taking cognizance of these aspects can construe adequate responses to dissipate the benefits 
to individuals as well as to the larger society.  I believe that this should start by recognizing 
the fact that remittances are very individualistic in nature and that both positive spillovers and 
externalities arising out of emigration or remittance receipts are uncertain and unaccounted 
for.  Migration and remittance transfers have been results of individual optimizing behavior 
as a dominant mechanism and were mostly uninfluenced by social returns it might generate.  
For example, it is indeed likely that positive probability of migration in a society induces 
human capital formation among the non-migrants when social returns from such action 
accumulates over private returns.  In this connection, one needs to find out the flow of 
migrants and remittance receipts based on what is optimal for the society.  Besides, given the 
huge stock of migrants and yet a limited dependence on private actions to foster local 
economic growth, there is a strong cause for public intervention to take stock of the 
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advantages and disadvantages and adopt corrective measures if required.  This calls for 
systematic information on the pattern of emigration and mode of transfers, which 
subsequently can help to design suitable tax-subsidy schemes for promoting technical 
education, language proficiency etc.  A greater provision of public goods including schools, 
health care systems or publicly managed immigrant advice centers created with direct 
contributions from the immigrants themselves can help to realize some of the positive 
externalities that individual decisions generate but without being aware of it and therefore 
either over-performing or under-performing on each such action.  It is established in the 
concerned literature that probability of migration up to a certain level is welfare enhancing 
for all non-migrants both in terms of human capital formation and average income growth.  
This implies that a well-designed migration policy enforced by the government is always 
better than one that is fully influenced by private decisions alone.           
Seasonality of migration or remittance receipts can also be an important source of 
information for state budgetary provisions to tide over periods of general distress – after all 
migration and remittance receipts are both significantly influenced by state of affairs 
prevailing in the destination.   During the recent Gulf wars many migrants from Kerala had to 
leave their jobs and return home facing an uncertain future.  If the local government actually 
internalizes such possibilities, all such transitions may be less difficult for the migrants.   
Apart from that, what is meant by the social externality of migration may be elaborated with 
an example.  Consider a poor village, which regularly sends immigrants to a foreign country 
(could have been caused by some initial connections or social network with prior migrants 
and so on) and the residents send back remittances in cash or kind.  The prime beneficiaries 
are obviously the members of that household which has sent out the worker.  The increased 
wealth in that household (and many such households) would spillover to the local markets, 
financial intermediaries and so on.  However, if the village was initially devoid of better 
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educational or health facilities, it is not necessary that the situation would drastically change 
due to such income effects.  It is possible that private facilities may develop to cater to these 
richer households, but it may not be automatic and hardly inclusive, and the general problem 
of market failure may continue (consider unavailability of paved roads, covered sewage 
system, street lights, drinking water etc.).  The households that can afford so might even 
move to a location where better facilities are sufficiently available, creating both 
interpersonal and inter-regional disparities in income.  Without voluntary and consorted 
efforts among the rural beneficiaries to set up these facilities (which is again subject to 
several impediments, including the free-rider problem) or active involvement of the state in 
providing the same by suitable taxation schemes on remittance receipts, the benefits of 
remittances can only be very individualistic.  The participation of the government in 
managing the flows is thus important in the sense that relevant information on various aspects 
that potentially influence migration and remittances are often external to individual agents 
and can be better acted upon in a macroeconomic set up.  The same holds true of the 
remittance flow and a central repository of information and resources might play a very 
important role in devising incentive schemes either to stall or facilitate migration depending 
upon the social optimum.  Thus, it is imperative on the part of the state to take stock of the 
impact of migration and remittances from time to time and use the information to revise the 
existing policies.   
The Kerala case study also points out some serious lacuna in understanding and 
interpreting the effects of migration and remittances in general.  While the information on 
Kerala is available to a considerable extent, there are many other regions within the country 
with substantially large flow of emigrants that do not preserve any systematic account of 
either the migrants or of the remittance inflow.  The concerned departments should prioritize 
collection and dissemination of the relevant information.  Second, the impact of remittances 
18 
 
as commonly observed are rather localized in character, which again can potentially create 
pockets of affluence as also high dependence on such external sources of income.  The state 
should act more specifically to create cushions against any adverse income shocks 
(remembering that a significant share is generated from dependence on oil resources in the 
Middle East) and offer guidance towards alternative choices, among which fostering higher 
levels of human capital enabling wider options should be a priority.  This is even more 
important in the wake of Mode 4 movement of natural persons as being negotiated under the 
GATS, which requires that the potential migrant is at least a bachelor’s degree holder to 
qualify for the schemes.  Interestingly, the state can utilize the enormous resources floating 
around as migrant remittances to the advantage of both migrants and non-migrants by using 
the funds towards building of infrastructure that can generate high returns on each unit of 
capital invested.  Once again, some of these policies have been put to test in Kerala and the 
rest of the country must take these features more seriously to explore a very potent source of 
development.  After all, poverty is not limited to lack of income alone, there are several other 
factors that are equally important.   
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Table 1.  NRI (Non-resident Indian) Deposits Outstanding (US$ mn.) 
Year                 
(end-
March) 
NR(E)RA FCNR(A) FCNR(B) NR(NR)RD FC(B&O)D FC(O)N Total 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1991 3618 10103 - - 265 - 13986 
1992 3025 9792 - - 732 - 13549 
1993 2740 10617 - 621 1037 - 15015 
1994 3523 9300 1108 1754 533 12 16230 
1995 4556 7051 3063 2486 - 10 17166 
1996 3916 4255 5720 3542 - 13 17446 
1997 4983 2306 7496 5604 - 4 20393 
1998 5637 1 8467 6262 - 2 20369 
1999 6045 - 7835 6618 - - 20498 
2000 6758 - 8172 6754 - - 21684 
2001 7147 - 9076 6849 - - 23072 
2002 8449 - 9673 7052 - - 25174 
2003 14923 - 10199 3407 - - 28529 
2004 20559 - 10961 1746 - - 33266 
2005 21291 - 11452 232 - - 32975 
2006 P 22070 - 13064  - - 35134 
P                    Provisional 
FCNR(A)      Foreign currency non-resident (accounts). 
FCNR(B)      Foreign currency non-resident (banks). 
FC(B&O)D   Foreign currency (bank and other) deposits. 
NR(E)RA      Non-resident (external) Rupee accounts. 
NR(NR)RD   Non-resident (non-repatriable) Rupee deposits. 
FC(O)N         Foreign currency (ordinary) non-repatriable deposits. 
Source:          Reserve Bank of India, Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.  Stability Patterns for Total Emigration, Total Remittances and Remittance/NSDP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Test 2 is a modified and more reliable version of Test 1.  
 
 
 
 
Variable 
 
Time Trend Follower Break Year 
Test 1 Test 2 Test 1 Test 2 
Total Emigration Unstable Unstable 1984-1999 1984-1999.6 
Total Remittances Stable Unstable None 1984-2000.6 
Remittance/NSDP Stable Unstable None 1984-2002 
20 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Indian Immigrants in the Gulf Countries 
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Source: Labor Bureau, GOI, various years 
 
 
Figure 2: Distribution of Private Transfers from Non-Resident Workers 
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Table 3.  Distribution and Change in total number of Emigrants for Districts in 
Kerala between 1999 and 2004 
 
District Emigrants  Emigrants per 100 
Households 
   Return Emigrants  
          
 2004 1999 % 
Change 
2004 1999 % 
Change 
2004 1999 % 
Change 
Thiruvanantha- 
puram  
168046 130705 28.57 21.5 19.9 8.04 103059 118878 -13.3069 
Kollam  148457 102977 44.17 24.4 18.4 32.61 69314 74106 -6.46641 
Pathanamthitta  133720 97505 37.14 44.3 33.1 33.84 83502 54537 53.11073 
Alappuzha  75036 62870 19.35 15.2 13.2 15.15 43109 34572 24.69339 
Kottayam  106569 35494 200.25 24 9.1 163.74 28368 18164 56.17705 
Idukki  7880 7390 6.63 2.9 2.9 0.00 3766 5017 -24.9352 
Eranakulam  121237 103750 16.85 16.9 17 -0.59 74435 45028 65.30825 
Thrissur  178867 161102 11.03 27.2 25.6 6.25 86029 116788 -26.3375 
Palakkad  177876 116026 53.31 32.6 21.8 49.54 55008 39238 40.19063 
Malappuram  271787 296710 -8.40 45 49.2 -8.54 141537 123750 14.37333 
Kozhikode  167436 116026 44.31 28.6 22 30.00 109101 60910 79.11837 
Wayanad  7704 4552 69.24 4.4 2.9 51.72 3852 3327 15.77998 
Kannur  202414 88065 129.85 43.2 19 127.37 45394 28263 60.61282 
Kasaragod  71449 38747 84.40 30.6 19.1 60.21 47468 16667 184.8023 
Total  1838478 1361955 34.99 26.7 21.4 24.77 893942 739245 20.92635 
 
Source: Kerala State Planning Board, Economic Review 2004.     
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Table 4. Total Number of Emigrants and Remittance Receipts in Kerala 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Kerala State Planning Board.   
Note: 1 Billion = 100 crores 
 
 
 
 
Year Number of Emigrants 
Remittances 
(Rs. Crore) 
1982 230740 432 
1983 274804 568 
1984 273342 780 
1985 313980 523 
1986 329083 861 
1987 364909 891 
1988 405513 824 
1989 449611 1156 
1990 510214 873 
1991 566668 2428 
1992 637103 3025 
1993 754544 3882 
1994 819025 6084 
1995 957388 7069 
1996 1062376 9521 
1997 1178589 10761 
1998 1318489 10817 
1999 1412649 13652 
2000 1501917 14438 
2001 1600465 15732 
2002 1717695 17362 
2003 1844023 18475 
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Figure 1. Total Number of Emigrants and Remittance Receipts in Kerala
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
16000
18000
20000
19
82
19
83
19
84
19
85
19
86
19
87
19
88
19
89
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
Year
Em
ig
ra
n
ts
 
('0
00
) a
n
d 
Re
m
itt
a
n
c
es
 
(R
s
.
 
Cr
o
re
)
Number of Emigrants (in thousands) Remittances (in Rs. Crore/10 mn)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
24 
 
 
Remittance and Poverty – Econometric Specifications 
The econometric specification of the problem is given by: 
1 2 3ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( / )it it i t i t i t tP PCNSDP gini REM NSDP          (3)    
Here, ln( )itP stands for different measures of poverty (i) at time t and include, natural 
logarithms of the head count ratio for urban poor (HCRU), head count ratio for the rural poor 
(HCRR), poverty gap (PG) and the squared poverty gap (SPG).  As discussed, the alternative 
specification for our econometric model is given by: 
1 2 3ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( / )it it i t i t i t tP APCE gini REM NSDP         (4) 
where, ceteris paribus, ln(PCNSDP)  is replaced by the ln(APCE).  The results of the 
regression estimates provide the elasticity of these different measures of poverty and are 
reported in table 7 and all the regressions generate high values of 2R .  We report only the 
one-way random effects model for the panel regressions.  It is well-known that for the 
diagnostics test in a panel regression, large values of the Lagrange multiplier (LM) statistic 
argue in favor of one of the one-factor models against the classical regression with no group 
specific effects.  On the other hand, large values of the Hausman test statistic favor the choice 
of fixed effects model over random effects model.  It follows from the results of both LM test 
statistics and Hausman test statistics as reported in table 7 for various dependent and 
explanatory variables that the random effects model is the appropriate choice in every case. 
 
 
 
25 
 
 
Table 4.  Elasticity of Poverty, Estimated using Panel Data One-Way Fixed Effects Model 
Dependent Variable 
 
 HCRR    HCRU                         Poverty Gap              Sq. 
Poverty Gap 
Explanatory Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
        
-0.0169  -0.0093  -93.59  -93.5  
(-0.84)  (-0.46)  (-2.31)*  (-2.29)^  Per capita NSDP 
 
 0.00014  0.00014
3 
 0.1509  0.1508 
 (1.7)  (1.75)  (0.8)  (0.81) 
 
APCE 
 
1.00009 1.00007 1.00009 1.00007 0.756 0.767 0.755 0.766 
(21782.5)*
* 
(22119.5)
** 
(21603.7
)** 
(22204)*
* 
(8.1)** (7.44)** (8.09)** (7.44)** Gini Coefficient 
 
-0.0733 -0.0939 -0.0779 -0.0964 -54.83 -101.7 -54.82 -101.6 
(-3.34)** (-4.26)** (-3.52)** (-4.39)** (-1.23) (-2.02)^ (-1.23) (-2.02)^ Remittance/NSDP 
 
LM-Test Statistic 2.55 2.56 2.5 2.52 2.43 2.67 3.1 2.62 
Hausman Test 
Statistic 
0.02 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02 
 
N 
 31 28 31 28 31 28 31 28 
Adj R-squared 0.9 0.89 0.92 0.87 0.93 0.9 0.92 0.83 
t-ratios shown in parenteheses; all values expressed in natural logarithm 
** - Significant at 1% level; * - Significant at 5% level and ^- Significant at 10% level. 
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